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«Буду я заготовлять»

«Буду я заготовлять»
Давид хотел построить дом Богу, но Бог не позволил. Слишком много было войн и крови. Не Давиду строить храм. 
Но Давид мог помочь тому, кто будет строить. Он мог заготовить материал для своего сына, чтобы тому осталось лишь начать и закончить.
«Итак, буду я заготовлять для него», — решил Давид. «И заготовил Давид до смерти своей много» (1 Пар. 22:5).
Сколько это, «много»? «Я при скудости моей приготовил для дома Господня сто тысяч талантов золота и тысячу тысяч талантов серебра, а меди и железа нет веса, потому что их множество; и дерева и камня я также заготовил, а ты еще прибавь к этому» (14). Это обращение Давида к сыну показывает великую эстафету веры и служения. Отец приготовил, сын добавил и построил.
Царь Давид смирился со своей ролью заготовителя, подготовителя. У царя Соломона будет более почетная роль строителя. Но оба царя, лучшие из лучших, были всего лишь предтечами будущего события. Из их рода произойдет Мессия. Он станет настоящим Храмом и будет жить среди людей во всей непосредственности. И эта история продолжается. Мы все готовим возвращение Мессии, мы все трудимся для Его Царства. 
Не каждому из нас дано стать строителем, царем, победителем. Но каждый может приготовить нечто нужное для тех, кто сможет построить дом, храм, царство.  
Мы можем подражать Давиду, который позаботился о будущем сына и всего народа. Давид сделал все, что мог, чтобы сын реализовал его мечту: «Золоту, серебру, и меди, и железу нет числа; начни и делай; Господь будет с тобою» (16).
Что приготовили мы? 
Что мы делали в своей жизни – тратили или собирали, расточали собранное отцами или заготовляли для потомков? 
Скажем вместе с Давидом: «Буду заготовлять!»

Физика Воскресения

Физика Воскресения
«Воистину воскрес!», — отвечаем мы почти инстинктивно. Но что это значит — «воскрес», как это чувствуется, переживается, проявляется?
Мы верим в то, что Христос воскрес, но путаемся в том, что именно это означает для нас и нашей жизни, здесь и сейчас.
Мы верим так, будто прочитали о Воскресении в «золотой книге» сказок, а не в ленте срочных новостей. 
Мы читаем Библию как художественную книжку, а не  Слово Божье, обращенное к нам.
Мы знаем, что все это что-то значит и что-то меняет, но в целом продолжаем жить как раньше.
Мы не решаемся принять факт Воскресения как начало новой жизни. Скорее, мы оставляем этот факт где-то там, в далеком прошлом, а нашу нынешнюю жизнь помещаем в совсем иной контекст, иную историю, историю без чудес. 
Мы готовы говорить о духовных вопросах, но не знаем, как они связаны с вопросами более прозаичными, повседневными, личными, общественными, материальными. 
Блестяще выразился Честертон: 


«Мы нередко слышим, что христианство может остаться как дух, как атмосфера. Поистине, многие хотели бы, чтобы оно осталось как призрак. Но оно не хочет. После каждой его смерти не тень встает, но воскресает тело. Многие готовы проливать благочестивые слезы над могилой Сына Человеческого, но они совсем не готовы увидеть, как Сын Божий идет по утренним холмам… И вот мы говорим: «Мы привыкли к разведенному, разбавленному, обесцвеченному христианству. Но Ты хорошее вино сберег доселе».

В самом деле, воскресение Христа меняет все. Последствия случившегося мы можем чувствовать, видеть, переживать не только духовно, но и физически. 
Воздух пахнет воскресением. Природа напоминает о Воскресшем. Мы ощущаем новую жизнь повсюду, даже в собственном бренном теле. 
Мир после Пасхи стал другим. Дай Боже нам это увидеть. Дай нам Боже пасхальной радости в духе и теле, на земле как на небе!

Иногда математика – грех

Иногда математика – грех
Давиду мало было царствовать, воевать и сочинять псалмы. Он решил заняться математикой – исчислить свой народ и извлечь из этих чисел максимальную выгоду. 
Историки путаются, кто именно «возбудил» Давида сделать перепись Израильтян – Господь (2 Царств 24:1) или сатана (1 Пар. 21:1). 
Но оба варианта согласны в том, что это решение царя было плохим, и было связано с «восстанием сатаны» и «гневом Господа».
Господь допустил, а сатана очень постарался, чтобы Давид проявил свои до поры скрытые амбиции в математике. Царь решил учесть и присвоить, записать на свой счет и «поставить на счетчик» каждого Израильтянина: «Пойдите исчислите Израильтян, от Вирсавии до Дана, и представьте мне, чтоб я знал число их» (1 Пар. 21:2).
Это не понравилось даже прагматичному Иоаву. Военачальник вступает в спор с царем: «Да умножит Господь народ Свой во сто раз против того, сколько всего есть… Для чего же требует сего господин мой? Чтобы вменилось это в вину Израилю?».
Обратим внимание. Иоав напоминает Давиду, что народ принадлежит не царю, но Богу. Математика – Божественная наука. Бог может умножить народ и укрепить царство. Это не во власти царя. 
Но царь хочет освоить божественную науку, хочет умножения цифр, доходов, побед, власти. Царь зашел слишком далеко. 
«И не угодно было в очах Божиих дело сие, и Он поразил Израиля».
Язва забрала жизнь семидесяти тысяч человек. Статистика ухудшилась в один день. 
Царь кается. Родственники хоронят погибших. 
***
Иногда математика может быть грехом. Когда мы считаем людей своей собственностью. Когда мы исчисляем власть, богатство и силу, забывая, что мы лишь слуги Господа Бога. 
Мы, люди, способны лишь на действия «отнять» и «поделить». От наших самоуверенных действий – одни потери. Мы знаем лишь математику греха. «Прибавить» и «умножить» может только Бог. Это Его наука, наука приумножения и благословения, недоступная ученым и царям. 
Нам остается лишь слушаться Божьих законов  и не придумывать свою личную математику. 
Произвол одного человека стоил жизнь семидесяти тысяч. Наши игры в науку и власть обходятся слишком дорого. Они греховны, потому что претендуют на принадлежащее Богу. Они смертельно опасны, потому что нарушают законы жизни. 
Иногда быть умным – значит быть послушным. Это все, что нам надо. Но, увы, цари всегда хотят большего. 

Protestants and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church: In Search of Inclusive Solutions

Protestants and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church: In Search of Inclusive Solutions

 Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, 2018, Vol. 32, Its. 2.
Post-Soviet Protestants, having gotten used to coexistence with an atheistic society over the course of 70 years, have discovered something new in the years since Ukraine gained independence – Orthodox tradition. It did not happen at once, but the first attempts have been made at reclassifying the relationship between Protestants and Orthodox as other, not foreign. However the Orthodox other is not the only other. In dialogue with the official Orthodox Church, it is easy to lose sight of the diversity within Orthodoxy (Orthodox churches are “other” to each other), and also the coexistence in the same cultural arena of Catholic and Greek Catholic churches. The disunity of the Orthodox Church and its internal diversity should be especially interesting to Protestants, because it creates the opportunity for a confessional census. Put simply, when there are multiple “others,” then there is room for the Protestants as well. Diversity is a fact, which, when considered, sheds light on precedents and also rights. 
Ukrainian Protestantism is a synthesis of Western and Eastern Christian traditions. Therefore its main “other” is not Orthodoxy, but Catholicism, and the closest by tradition is Greek Catholicism. Notably, the ties between Protestants and Catholics and Uniates are well understood and are emphasized by the Russian Orthodox Church, but Protestants were not much aware of these ties until two recent events. First, the “Ekman affair” created a stir – when the leader of the Word of Life neo-Pentecostal movement, which is widespread in Ukraine, converted to Catholicism. And second, new opportunities for ties between the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) arose thanks to the Maidan protests in Kiev (November 2013-February 2014). For a majority of Protestants both of these events were their first encounter with and discovery of the “other,” and drew their attention to co-existing traditions, what sets these traditions apart and how these traditions fit with their own tradition.
In recent years a significant migration has been identified between confessions and a steady growth of “just Christians,” a majority of whom can be identified as “seekers.” These tendencies reflect a real demand for open dialogue between traditions that is mutually interesting and fulfilling.
Protestants and Uniates are united by a series of characteristics: the superiority of the Western theological tradition, openness to the cultural inheritance of Eastern Christianity, and their experience of a “catacomb” existence during Soviet times. Both Protestants and Greek Catholics, during both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, found themselves in the minority, not fitting into the socio-cultural homogenization of their society. Protestants stood out for their democracy, individualism, and autonomy. Greek-Catholics stood out for their nationalism, strong ethnic culture, and internal cultural and theological heterogeneity. This diversity of persevering minorities presented a direct threat to the Soviet project, because they were oppositional and uncontrollable. Both communities had ingrained in their nature, and expressed outwardly, the archetypal protest of diversity against monotony, inclusivity against exclusivity, individual choice against imposed collective choice. And at that time the characteristics of the imperial Orthodox culture were different: a focus on homogeneity, suppression of diversity, and a collectivist interpretation of individual rights.[1]   
After Ukraine gained independence, the Greek Catholics and the Protestants gained an opportunity for full fledged church life – no longer relegated to a regional or marginal status. Both groups, thanks to their synthetic Western-Eastern natures, fit well in the European-oriented trajectory of Ukraine, which would preserve the national character and memory of the best traditions of Eastern Christianity. This raises questions of the prospects for development of a Protestant-Uniate dialogue and its social and ecumenical potential. The following theses will be devoted to consideration of this question. Prospects for dialogue and cooperation are viewed through an analysis of the synthetic nature of Ukrainian Protestantism and Greek Catholicism as Western-Eastern churches, with similar experience of a “catacomb” existence as minority sects, an active pro-European position, and participation in the Ukrainian “Revolution of Dignity.”   
  
Ukrainian Protestantism and Greek Catholicism are both, in their history and their theological character, synthetic West-East projects. The conscious internal diversity of each of these traditions can serve as the foundation for mutual acceptance, recognition in each other of similarities and connection. However external dialogue will not be successful without reflection on each of their own complex identities. We must admit that despite the seeming obviousness, dialogue between Protestant and Greek Catholic traditions will be difficult for the churches to accept. Preservation of the internal diversity can only be accomplished through theological meta-reflective efforts. 
Thus Baptist researcher Constantine Prokhorov came to the conclusion that, “Not in the least denying the significance of the ‘foreign factor’ in the formation of the early Russian Evangelical-Baptist communities, it is important to see their heterogeneity, including both westward-looking and national tendencies, and to balance examples of the direct or mediated adoptions of European Protestant ideas with a certain self-reliance on the part of the ‘counter streams.’”[2]And he gives an example from the story of the “conversion” of Ratushny and Tsymbal, who later went on to become legendary Ukrainian stundists. M.T. Ratushny, remembering his youth, wrote to a Mennonite, G.I. Fast in St. Petersburg in 1893, “I had started to ask Germans (because I knew that the Russian people do not know about God and His law)… how I might be saved… I met an old man, a German who had repented, and he said to me: ‘Buy a Bible and read it…’ In 1857 I bought a Bible and began to read it, but I understood nothing of what I read. I applied to the old man who had advised me to buy the Bible, and he instructed me.”[3]In 1869 Efim Tsymbal asked German Mennonite Abram Unger to baptize him according to his faith. Prokhorov emphasizes the fact that “it is significant that Tsymbal did not finally become a member of any German church, but, in spite of pressure from the authorities, founded a number of independent Ukrainian Stundo-Baptist congregations.”[4]
In other words, Ukrainian Protestantism arose at the crossroads between various influences, and does not fully identify with any single one of them, instead holding onto all of them and expressing them in a relevant way in the national culture. 
Here is how a Greek Catholic characterizes the internal dialogic nature of his own tradition: “The Greek Catholic Church needs to be viewed in the context of Church history as a natural development towards unity. Being fully immersed in one’s own tradition keeps one from seeing things clearly. The Orthodox Church sees the world through the lens of its own experience and the Catholic Church does likewise. Only the Uniate, as a sort of church metaposition, gives the opportunity to see both traditions from a distance, which is why it is more productive. All signs point to the fact that Greek Catholics as a church act with the strength of a new attitude towards church tradition (not to be confused with Tradition), new methods of perception and are a project of authentic expression of Orthodox tradition in the context of the Universal church.”[5]
It seems to me that the words of Igor Manannikov can be paraphrased like this: Inasmuch as the Greek Catholic Church can be seen as an expression of the Orthodox tradition in the context of the Catholic Church, it can also be seen as an expression of the Catholic tradition in a national (Ukrainian) context. 
Ukrainian religious scholars note in their research that it is not enough to assign Greek Catholicism a Western vector; with no connection to Eastern tradition there is a break in its identity, a Catholicizing. Thus in the 19thcentury, during the aggressive expansion of Orthodoxy from the East, the West also had an assimilating influence: “Hundreds of thousands of uniates did not join the Russian Orthodox Church, and therefore found themselves for decades in a marginal, in-between condition, while after the manifesto of religious tolerance in 1905 there was no massive religious conversion in these lands – hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian uniates moved to the Roman Catholic Church. Gradually in her ranks they began to lose their indigenous national identity. In other words, catholicizing was followed in most cases by their becoming more Polish.”[6]
The conditions, nature, and method of preserving Greek Catholicism can be called a connection of Eastern and Western traditions, their adoption and expression in one another. Without reception of “orthodoxy” (not the Moscow patriarchate, but the global tradition), Greek Catholicism loses its uniqueness, the synthesis falls apart and Greek Catholics have no reason to not become just Catholics. 
The same can be said for Ukrainian Protestants. Without accepting Ukrainian culture and Orthodox tradition as their foundation, Ukrainian Protestants would be simply Protestants in Ukraine, i.e., outsiders, Westerners, not-quite-Catholics. It is no coincidence that Protestants and Catholics are still viewed by the Ukrainian people as expressions of the same “Latin heresy.” With no connection with “Orthodoxy,” in most regions of Ukraine they are out of place. 
Because Ukraine itself is a synthetic creation, lying between Europe and Eurasia, the West and the East, Ukrainian churches must contain within themselves this duality, this synthesis. What sets the Protestants and Greek Catholics apart is that they consider Western culture their main tradition without rejecting Eastern tradition, preserving even in their name a global scale, consistency, and the possibility of unity. 
Before his conversion to Catholicism, Ulf Ekman, bishop of the neo-Pentecostal Word of Life movement, had questions about the temporary and complimentary character of Protestant “revivals,” and their connection to the tree of Catholic tradition: “Should not revival movements join something bigger for the preservation of their uniqueness…?”[7]“Every movement has one message – not all fullness – and anointing for fulfilling a single concrete task – not all at once. Every movement has its own time, but is not eternal. In John’s joyous meeting with Jesus there is a prophetic meaning: a meeting of the whole with a part, a meeting of the general and the concrete enriches both sides. Revival, personified by John and his ministry, is something necessary and important, and ideally leading to the enrichment and deepening of Christian experience in the entire Body of Christ.”[8]
In search of inclusive identity, Ukrainian Protestants are restoring the cultural-theological connection with European Protestantism, and through that, with the Catholic tradition to which European Protestantism traces its roots. At the same time Protestants embrace (as in, make their own, as much as possible) the Orthodox tradition, which has remained the national religion in Ukraine. Greek Catholicism is a response to these two interests – it is a concrete expression of both Catholic and Orthodox tradition in Ukrainian culture. Therefore by appealing at the same time to both Catholicism and Orthodoxy, Protestants come face to face with them in the shape of Greek Catholicism as a close, related “other.” It is possible that German or Russian Protestants can appeal directly to, respectively, Catholic or Orthodox tradition, but for Ukrainian Protestants this appeal is mediated by the Greek Catholic tradition. 
In search of a common ground, Ukrainian Protestants and Greek Catholics can appeal not only to structural similarity, but also to common history. The “catacomb” experience and ministry as minority sects must be seen as a unifying factor, providing common ground in the developing Protestant-Uniate dialogue. As Protestant writer Elena Panych wrote, “Nothing gives such a feeling of unity as the overlap of cultural and human experience… but in the Soviet state even these important factors… were second in importance to the shared experience of persecution, which believers experienced, and which gave them a feeling of not only spiritual unity, but a unity of fate.”[9]
There are dozens of stories passed down through oral history of joint services, prayers, and mutual support during Soviet repression. The sect status and marginality of the Protestants, and the regionalism and nationalism of the Greek Catholics, were due to the nonconformity of the active church minority. There were also attempts at fitting into the existing order, such as the well-known loyalism of the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians – Baptists and the self-liquidation of Greek Catholics, and their apparent union with the Orthodox Church. But even within the general Soviet order the Church kept its otherness, at least as a “Church within the Church.” According to Natalia Shlikhta, even orthodoxized former Greek Catholics remained different within the new community: “Demonstrating for show Orthodox and Soviet loyalty, these Greek Catholics constructed a new or, as David Thompson defined it, short-lived identity, which helped them keep their own religious and national identity.”[10]This otherness of the Greek Catholics became more radical in underground communities: “Taking into account the unbreakable connection between ‘Orthodox’ and ‘Soviet,’ refusing an ‘Orthodox identity’ put into question in the eyes of both Western Ukrainians and Soviet leadership their political loyalty. Emerging from the historical and ecclesiological inheritance of the UGCC, the self-identification of its members can be more correctly characterized as ‘sect,’ than ‘church’… It was more difficult for Greek Catholics than for Orthodox to resolve the conflict between Christian faith and loyalty, which was anti-religious in its essence.”[11] 
Both Protestants and Greek Catholics had an opportunity of demarginalization and restoration of their regular church practice after Ukrainian independence, but it turned out that in an “Orthodox” society they were still perceived as inferior forms of Christianity. The Maidan protests created a new opportunity for nation-wide recognition, and also an unexpectedly rich and free experience of Protestant-Uniate unity. Religious scholars talked about the birth of a “civil Church” on the Maidan, in which confessional differences were set aside for the sake of joint Christian service to society.[12]Back at the beginning of the “Revolution of Dignity,” on December 15, 2013, at the initiative of the Ukrainian Catholic University, there was a round table on “Theology in the Context of Maidan,” which included representatives of the Greek Catholic and Orthodox churches, as well as Ukrainian Protestants who supported the national protest and offered a theological justification for it. Two days later Protestants held an inter-church discussion “Maidan and the Church: A Christian’s Civil Responsibility.” These two events were the beginning of a Church campaign of mass support for Maidan. They demonstrated a new understanding of the Church, unity, freedom, and responsibility. The main actors on the Maidan were not priests and Levites, but good Samaritans of various confessions, and the force that united them, recognized by Protestants, was the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. 
After Maidan the confessional map of Ukraine began to change steadily. And no longer under pressure from politicians (as with the project “One Local Orthodox Church”) but under the influence of the expectations of civil society and as a result of the activities of regular lay people. After Maidan it was the pro-Russian churches that turned out to be sects, while pro-Ukrainian churches received recognition. It seems clear that inter-church dialogue will have an affect on self understanding in Ukrainian society, bringing recognition that it is not only Orthodox. And it will affect the community’s perception of the Church through its various forms, and also how it is seen by “dwellers” and “seekers,” Christians near the church and unchurched. 
It must be admitted that both Ukrainian Protestants and Greek Catholics kept away from ecumenical processes, even in relation to close neighbors in the Christian world they remained closed and self-reliant. This made the publication a document from the World Council of Churches on the importance of ecumenical dialogue in the Christian magazine Theological Reflections(2014) even more noteworthy. The document, “The Church: Towards a Common Vision,” was published in 2013 and was the result of the multi-year work of the “Faith and Church Order” commission. In the document Catholicity refers not simply to geographic reach but also to the manifold variety of local churches and their participation in the fullness of faith and life that unites them in the one koinonia.[13]It is noteworthy that the last chapter, “The Church: In the World and for the World,” reveals a more ecumenical perspective than the others, because koinonia means openness to one another and the world, which involves not only confessing a single faith and serving together, but also sharing common moral values. Churches will be able to show the world only that which they share in Christ and consider through a process of mutual questioning and affirmation. That is why the future of ecumenical dialogue is in simultaneous service of the mission and unity of the Church, therefore it is important to find opportunities for joint responses to social issues and joint work in presenting the values of God’s Kingdom.[14].
The emphasis on the significance of practical ecumenicalism in the form of a shared social position is by no means a coincidence. The Ukrainian experience shows that unity is reached not through theological discussions, but is given in response to synchronized Christian participation in extreme moments of history. The socio-political statement of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (AUCCRO) – a consultative advisory body which unites the main confessions of the country and in which decisions are made on the basis of consensus – became a precedent for such a shared position. The position of the AUCCRO served as a point of reference for the self-determination of entire churches and for civil choices for Christians during the “Orange Revolution” and later the “Revolution of Dignity.” 
Protestant-Uniate dialogue has significant social potential, and religious inclusivity can be a factor in social plurality and dynamics. Pastor Sergey Tymchenko uses the word “synergy” when speaking of the results of Maidan for Protestants and their status as “other”: “One issue Ukrainian and Russian evangelicals need to consider is their attitude to “the other”… Interestingly, when evangelicals lose unity, they sometimes find more in common with believers of other confessions, particularly in the Slavic context with Orthodox and Eastern-Rite [Greek] Catholics who have similar socio-political perspectives. In the future, this phenomenon may lead to the development of a more complimentary, synergetic relationship among Ukrainian Christians of different confessions.”[15]
Orthodox theologian and director of the Institute of Ecumenical Studies, Antoine Arjakovsky,emphasizes the special role of the Church in the “Revolution of Dignity,” and the socio-political significance of this ecumenical movement: “The Churches are playing a decisive role in the Ukrainian revolution. This is apparent from the prominence in Independence Square of dozens of priests and pastors from different religious confessions who have been there every day for three months, offering to gather ecumenically with the faithful in prayer.”[16]Thinking of possible repercussions of this kind of ecumenism, he puts forward a solution called the Church of Kiev:It is a matter of an original ecclesiological construction proper to the Ukrainian space, as there existed until the end of the sixteenth century.” According to this idea, the Church can exist in communication with both the Greek and Latin worlds.[17]Moreover, Arjakovsky offers to transfer the model of inner-church East-West dialogism to the outward sphere of state-church geopolitics, as a means of free and non-conflicting orientation between Europe and Russia.[18]
Not only Protestantism,[19]but also Greek Catholicism ties Ukraine to Europe. As Ukrainian religious scholars write, “In Brest a new ‘window to Europe’ has opened wide.”[20]It must be admitted that in the past century both of these windows have remained practically unused by society. Today the European choice of Ukraine and the “Revolution of Dignity” create a demand for “Church windows” to Europe. 
It is worth noting that in conditions of Church crisis and the emerging “unchurched Christianity,” not only the social, but also the ecumenical potential of Protestant-Uniate relations is taking on special significance. 
Protestant-oriented Catholic Sergey Gradirovsky expressed in his questions the complex dialectic of church, inter-church, and non-church images of modern Christianity: “Is my movement authentic and without deceit, if I, while moving towards the Church, move away from the confessional aspects of Church? How can I trust the ecclesiological lines of the Apostle’s Creed, to clearly, and not conditionally and symbolically, see and truly experience the ‘one holy, catholic, and apostolic Church?’”[21]
In light of the approaching 500thanniversary of the Reformation I will risk expressing the thought that the greatest Reformation, having overcome the divisive reformation, can become a unifying reformation. If in 2017 Protestants and Catholics can once again unite, this new meeting may change both, creating an unimaginable dynamic for the whole Body of Christ, recreating the universal Church in the unity of her diversity. Such an opportunity is being seriously considered – in dialogue with churches and in the personal choices of “already dwellers” of various traditions and “still seekers.” It is very much possible that the reforming closeness between the Protestants and Catholics, between Ukrainian Evangelical Protestants and Greek Catholics, will take place not on the level of theological commissions and leaders, but on the level of the every day choices of millions of “Christians of tradition,” and “just Christians.” An example of this is Ulf Ekman, who made a personal choice in favor of joining with the Catholic tradition, while at the same time not rejecting the spiritual blessings of Protestantism and his experience of it. By his decision he took a step towards a common future, when “’A Christianity of personal repentance’ and ‘a Christianity of education and tradition’ – elements that were unexpected and had long-term perspective – fulfill each other. Personal and collective will in due course come together and take on their true meaning. A space will form for the free activity of the spirit and for a living and deep liturgy of services and prayer. Then individual initiatives will combine with hierarchical spiritual leadership… Internal life and social activity will mutually complete each other. Missions work and meditation will be interwoven.” Such was his description of the meeting of the two traditions within his personal life.[22]It is notable that the Protestant leader did not lead his whole denomination down this path. Thereby he addressed his gesture not so much to the hierarchy of various confessions as to regular believers and their personal choices. I think that “seekers” liked this. And not only “seekers” – thousands of members of Ukrainian “Word of Life” churches supported Ekman’s choice, while not leaving their churches. This means that they accepted the truth of Catholicism (deep roots, discovery of the mystic dimensions of Christian life, the beauty of the liturgy, etc.), while remaining Protestants. In a certain way they could be called Roman Protestants, i.e., Protestants returning to dialogue with Rome, within the space of catholicity. 
In the same way thousands of Protestants who experienced Maidan made a personal choice to recognize the Greek Catholics as their brothers. Many pastors recognized Cardinal Lyubomir Guzar and Archbishop Svyatoslav Shevchuk as heroes of our time. Protestants and Greek Catholics were united by Evangelical values of freedom and truth, and also by active patriotism. Ukrainian Orthodox (Kiev patriarchate) believers and Roman Catholics showed their solidarity with them. The connection between living individuals revealed a connection between the traditions of the East and West, Orthodoxy and Catholicism, as well as with “in-between,” complex, inclusive churches – Greek Catholics and the Protestants. 
Clearly in the modern world the meaning of individual choice in favor of inclusive identity and inter-church Christianity will grow, and church leaders won’t be able to control it. While before lay people asked the churches themselves (i.e., the clergy) questions about dialogue and unity among churches, now everything has changed. “Seekers” don’t ask questions, and if they do, then they answer them themselves. Church leaders have changed from answer-givers to observers. The initiative has passed to ordinary Christians. Now they are no longer asking standard questions, such as, “Can we pray together with Protestants?” or “Are there born again believers among the Greek Catholics?” But rather people are asking questions seeking to understand the meaning and consequences of that which has alreadytaken place: “How does understanding of the Church change, taking into account that church walls have alreadybecome transparent, and that a connection can be felt between several traditions at once, that the spiritual experience of unity alreadydoes not fit into a standard confessional framework, and the spiritual search is leading further and Christianity can be better understood not as living in a home, but as a pilgrimage?”
At the same time that Protestantism reveals its spiritual roots, depth, and history, Greek Catholicism is becoming Evangelical. Here they can serve one another, and, most importantly, our contemporaries. Simplicity and depth, the Gospel and tradition are interesting and effective together, not separately. Their dialogue is the path to unity in the Church in the diversity of her relevant concrete historical forms. Thus Ukrainian Protestants and Greek Catholics are predestined to converge not only by historical fate and structural similarity, but by national context and cultural demand, and also the theological-ecclesiological mystery of God’s Plan for the Church and its mission in the world. 
Bibliography
1.             Arjakovsky, Antoine. “The Role of the Churches in the Ukrainian Revolution.” (http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2014/03/06/3958163.htm)
2.             Ekman, Ulf.Spiritual Roots.Мoscow: Golden Pages, 2012. (Экман, Ульф. Духовные корни. Москва: Золотые страницы, 2012)
3.             Gradirovsky, Sergey. “Church Archaeology.” The Church Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow. Reports from an International Theological Conference, DCU, April 25-27, 2013. Cherkassy: Colloquium, 2014. p.42-55 (Градировский, Сергей. “Церковная археология”. Церковь вчера, сегодня и завтра. Доклады международной богословской конференции. ДХУ, 25-27 апреля 2013. Черкассы: Коллоквиум, 2014)  
4.             Manannikov, Igor. “Greek Catholicism in Russia as a Hypothesis.” http://www.religare.ru/2_23871.html(Мананников, Игорь. Греко-католицизм в России как гипотеза)
5.             Panych, Elena. “Sect or Church?” Theological Reflections. Special Edition. “Bible. Theology. Church.” 2013. p. 259-276 (Панич, Елена. Секта или церковь? Богословские размышления.Специальный выпуск “Библия. Богословие. Церковь”. 2013)
6.             Prokhorov, Constantine. “Between the West and East. Notes on the origin of the evangelical movement in Russia.” Theological Reflections. #13. 2012. p. 79-105
7.             Proshak, Vitaly V. “From Civil Spring to Democratic Summer. Constitution, Human Rights and Freedom of Religion in Eurasia.” Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2014. 
8.             Stokolos, Nadiya, Sheretyuk, Ruslana. Church Drama. Rivne: PP DM, 2012. (Стоколос, Надія; Шеретюк, Руслана. Драма Церкви. Рівне: ПП ДМ, 2012)
9.             Shlikhta, Natalia. The Church of Survivors. Soviet Ukraine, mid 1940s – early 1970s. Kharkiv: АКТА, 2011 (Шліхта, Наталія. Церква тих, хто вижив. Радянська Україна, середина 1940-х – початок 1970-х рр. Харків: АКТА, 2011.). 
10.           “The Church: Towards a Common Vision.” Theological Reflections. “Special Issue on Contemporary Ecclesiology,” 2014. p. 169-203
11.          Tymchenko, Sergiy. “The Current and Possible Impact of the Ukrainian Crisis on Ukrainian  Protestants.”East-West Church and Ministry Report. Summer 2014. Vol. 22, No.3. p. 22-23



[1]On the fate of religious minorities in the context of Russian and Soviet history see Proshak, Vitaly V. From Civil Spring to Democratic Summer. Constitution, Human Rights and Freedom of Religion in Eurasia.Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2014. “According to researchers, it was this resistance (Plurality vs. Homogeneity, Inclusiveness vs. Exclusiveness, Individual vs. Collective) that determined the identity of religious groups, and also the government’s and society’s attitudes towards them” (p. 170).
[2]Prokhorov, Constantine. “Between the West and East. Notes on the origin of the evangelical movement in Russia.” Theological Reflections. #13. 2012. p. 102
[3]Ibid. p. 82-83
[4]Ibid. p. 84
[5]Manannikov, Igor. “Greek Catholicism in Russia as a Hypothesis.” http://www.religare.ru/2_23871.html
[6]Stokolos, Nadia, Sheretyuk, Ruslana. Church Drama. Rivne, Ukraine: PP DM, 2012. p. 245
[7]Ekman, Ulf. Spiritual RootsМoscow: Golden Pages, 2012. p. 357
[8]Ibid. p. 359-360
[9]Panych, Elena. “Sect or Church?” Theological Reflections. “Special Edition. Bible. Theology. Church.” 2013. p. 274
[10]Shlikhta, Natalia. The Church of Survivors. Soviet Ukraine, mid 1940s – early 1970-s. Kharkiv: AKTA, 2011. p. 303
[11]Ibid. p. 302
[12]Gorkusha, Oksana, Filipovich, Lyudmila. “Born on the Maidan – The Civil Church of Ukraine” (http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/studios/studies_of_religions/56419/)
[13]“The Church: Towards a Common Vision.” Theological Reflections. “Special Issue on Contemporary Ecclesiology,” 2014. p. 185
[14]Ibid. p. 201-202
[15]Tymchenko, Sergiy. “The Current and Possible Impact of the Ukrainian Crisis on Ukrainian  Protestants.”  East-West Church and Ministry Report. Summer 2014. Vol. 22, No.3. p. 22-23
[16]Arjakovsky, Antoine. “The Role of the Churches in the Ukrainian Revolution.” ABC Religion and Ethics.  (http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2014/03/06/3958163.htm)
[17]Ibid. 
[18]Ibid. 
[19]I wrote in more detail on the connecting, mediatory, and transcultural role of Protestantism in my monograph, The European Reformation and Ukrainian Evangelical Protestantism(Kiev, 2008).
[20]Stokolos, Nadiya, Sheretyuk, Ruslana. Church Drama. Rivne: PP DM, 2012. p. 246
[21]Gradirovsky, Sergey. “Church Archaeology.” The Church Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow. Reports from an International Theological Conference, DCU, April 25-27, 2013. Cherkassy: Colloquium, 2014. p.42
[22]Ekman, Ulf. Spiritual Roots. Moscow: Golden Pages, 2012. p. 366-367

«The silent witness of the silent Church»

«The silent witness of the silent Church»
The book review for THE JOURNAL OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY (October 2017)
Josyf Slipyj. Memoirs / Eds. Ivan Dats’ko, Maryia Horyacha, 2nd edition. Lviv-Rome: Vidavnytstvo UKU (UCU Publishing House), 2014. — 608 p. + 40 ill.

Josyf Slipyj (Ukrainian: Йосиф Сліпий) (17 February 1893 – 7 September 1984) was a Major Archbishop of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Churchand a Cardinal of the Catholic Church. «Memoirs» of Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj is an important document of the denominational history of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and it is also a valuable source for everyone who is interested in the history of religion in the USSR, Ukraine, Orthodox-Catholic and church-state relations. The author calls himself «the silent witness of the silent Church» («The silent witness of the silent Church» p. 427). In this declaration one feels the inexplicable tragedy of the personal destiny of Metropolitan and the destiny of his church. When one wanted to shout to the whole world about the crimes of the Soviet regime against the Church, they had to remain silent and all they could do was just pray. The persecuted church could not tell the world what was happening, its voice did not make it through the «Iron Curtain.» However, it survived and lived — in the catacombs and prisons, in the hearts of the common believers and in the confession of the martyrs.
Josyf Slipyj recorded his memoirs almost immediately after arriving in Rome but kept them private. His cautious silence about the persecution of Christians in the USSR was part of the arrangements for his release. And also that was a way for him to show pastoral care for those whom his revelations could hurt. And only today we can hear his voice – not as a candid narrative but as a document of the epoch which is full of silence and gaps. And these gaps tell more than the filled out pages. This is the case when you need to read between the lines. Metropolitan could not but write the memoirs – they were expected and clamoured for by both his church and all the free world. And the way he wrote them speaks of the difficult situation he and his church were in. Metropolitan had long before realized that the Soviet government had come to stay and one would have to negotiate with it. Therefore, he asked the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) to stop the armed struggle with the Red Army, «which had defeated Hitler himself, and so, in the course of time, would overcome the UPA too» (p. 479). That was why he stressed his civil allegiance to the Soviet state. It was for this reason that he did not write anything that could permanently destroy his relationship with the authorities and thus deprive the UGCC of the chance to be recognized in the USSR and the imprisoned priests to be released.
Obviously, the main concerns described by Metropolitan in the period were connected to the consequences of the Pseudo-Synod of 1946 when the UGCC was in fact dissolved. But he does not say much about it, and only criticizes Kostelnyk and the Orthodoxy. He writes a lot about the difficulties of the everyday life but in quite a monotonous way. He is also monotonous in describing people. He saw an informer or villain, mean or weak almost in everyone. It is noteworthy that there are practically no biblical quotations in the text. In general, «Memoirs» make an impression of a somewhat artificial, haphazard and unripe text. It seems that Norman Cousens was right when he wrote that even being in Rome, it was difficult for Josyf Slipyj to realize the reality of his freedom (p. 559). He wrote that in a way as if he were still in the USSR where one had to pay with their own blood and make the Church suffer for every free word.
It is known that Khrushchev, when he was negotiating the release of Metropolitan, was most afraid that the newspapers would publish articles «The Bishop Tells About the Bolsheviks Tortures» (pp. 537, 554). And Metropolitan was afraid of it as much. The nature of this fear was religious political. Obviously, he was afraid, not of terrorist attacks or new arrests, nor of the anti-religious campaign in the USSR stepping up; rather, he was worried that the unique chance of the Thaw period to legalize the UGCC under the pressure of anti-Stalin exposures and the existing unique international situation would be missed. Apparently, he shared the hopes of many for the «triumvirate» (the USA, the USSR and the Vatican) to be successful in the struggle for peace; and he reckoned that the church could get its tribute for the diplomatic mediation.
Apart from the «Memoirs», other accompanying documents are also collected under its cover. We see a different Josyf Slipyj in them: a diplomat, a historian, a polemicist and a pastor. In the documents on negotiations with the Soviet authorities, Metropolitan speaks the language of compromise offering his assistance in establishing relations between the USSR, the USA and the Vatican (p. 401) and asserting that the UGCC is quite compatible with the communist course (p. 397). In memoranda addressed to the See of Rome there is no politics anymore and there is nothing personal; there is nothing except for the caring for the Church and those devotees who represent it, heroes of faith and good priests (pp. 486-487). On the whole, the collection of texts helps to discover the image of Josyf Slipyj as a patriarch of the catacomb church. The author describes his 18 years of humiliation as just a background which he uses to constantly speak about the church. His personal history is completely subordinated to the main theme – the history of the UGCC. However, when you read some extracts, it seems that Metropolitan was so focused and concerned about his church that it prevented him from seeing other denominations as part of the unitary church. Describing the «camp of believers» (p. 220) that brought together Catholics, Orthodox, Protestants and various “sectarians,” he shows no interest in the possibilities of «camp ecumenism»; he speaks exceptionally illabout the Orthodox and he turns down every offer of the belivers from other denominations to have fellowship and do ministry together. Thus, because of fear of informers and agent provocateurs, believers would often deprive themselves of Christian fellowship and brotherly support. The texts convey the atmosphere of state terror against believers, general suspiciousness, fatality and self-censorship quite well.
Besides the value of the documents themselves, what also needs to be noted is the achivement of the editors of the publication.  Fr. Dr. Ivan Dats’ko undertook a huge work  on collecing different texts and structuring them. It is obvious that for him, who formerly served as a private secretary of Metropolitan, the arranging of the book was not only a professional challenge but also a spiritual duty. Dr. Maryia Horyacha’s contribution was equally as important. She checked, commented on the texts and edited them. The book leaves a strong impression: compiling editors and their work were devoted not so much to Metropolitan the martyr as to the church for which he had suffered; therefore, the published text is not so much a monument of history, as it is a gift, a lesson and a covenant for present and future generations of the universal Church of Christ.

Religious persecutions in the occupied territories of Ukraine

The Baptist TimesApril 19, 2018


Religious persecutions are taking place in the occupied territories of Ukraine, and the global Christian community is encouraged to pray   


Ukraine flagWar continues to ravage eastern Ukraine, where conflict erupted in April 2014 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the violent actions of pro-Russian separatists. Along with forcing millions of people from their homes, the ongoing conflict has also resulted in the harsh persecution of Protestant pastors and churches throughout the territories that are occupied by pro-Russian separatist groups. One such group is the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), which is located in Ukraine’s Luhansk region and declared independence in May 2014.

While the international community does not recognise the LNR as a legitimate state, this group’s totalitarian power is growing. During the last four years, the LNR has committed countless acts of religious persecution against Protestant pastors and churches (as well as other pro-Ukrainian Churches) in the Luhansk region, including abduction, torture, and property confiscation. In fact, on March 27, 2018, the LNR raided the House of Prayer, a church in Stahanov, taking everything and leaving the church completely empty.

The following is a brief summary and analysis to create awareness about the LNR’s harsh new religion law and appeal to the international community to create pressure on the LNR and support our brothers and sisters in Ukraine who are losing their freedom to worship and living in constant fear as they suffer for their faith.

For the last four years, Mission Eurasia has drawn the attention of the international community to the systematic religious freedom violations committed by the LNR in eastern Ukraine. And now these violations are considered a central part of the LNR’s legal framework. According to a new law passed on February 2, 2018 (#211-II “About Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations”), the LNR is permitted to discriminate against any and all non-Orthodox religious communities. This law violates universal human rights, severely limits religious freedom, and threatens eastern Ukraine’s existing network of religious communities and organisations.

While the law itself is a new development, the LNR has been violating religious freedom rights in Ukraine’s Luhansk region since the spring of 2014. Rather than protecting the rights of pre- existing religious communities, the LNR follows Russia’s harsh religion laws. Therefore, in line with Russia’s strict religious freedom legislation, all religious communities and organizations in Luhansk, other than those associated with the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (Russian Orthodox Church has preferential status), must now prove their loyalty and re-register with the LNR. The following points laid out in the LNR’s new religion law are particularly concerning for churches in Luhansk:

• All religious communities and organisations must re-register with the LNR within six months of the law’s inception in order to continue operating;

• The LNR will play an increasingly significant role in regulating religious communities and organizations, and in protecting the societal role of the Russian Orthodox Church;

• All registered religious communities and organisations are required to provide detailed reports on all of their activities on a regular basis;

• Religious communities and organisations must have juridical person status to be considered legitimate;

• Religious communities and organisations must have at least 30 members to register;

• Religious communities and organisations are prohibited from leading activities in private residences, which is particularly dangerous for the many home churches in Luhansk;

• There are many grounds on which the LNR can suspend the activities of religious communities and organisations, such as suspected espionage, extremism, and terrorism;

• Religious communities and organisations are required to coordinate the distribution of all religious materials, even among their own members, with the LNR;

• There are very strict regulations placed on all religious communities and organisations that receive financial support from foreign sources.

The Baptist Union of Ukraine asserts that, even if churches in Luhansk try to re-register with the LNR, they will not be able to meet all of the requirements laid out in the new religion law.

In response, Mission Eurasia and our partner churches in Luhansk urge the global Christian community to prayerfully support our brothers and sisters who are suffering in the occupied territories of eastern Ukraine. We also implore international government leaders and human rights organisations to pressure the LNR to repeal the new law and restore religious freedom so that all religious communities in Luhansk and throughout Ukraine can worship freely.

At present, the pastors of many churches in the occupied territories of eastern Ukraine are refusing to participate in the re-registration process required by the LNR’s new religion law. These courageous leaders need our support as they stand firm in the face of escalating religious persecution

Как дерево

Как дерево
Притча Христа о бесплодной смоковнице, как и другие Его поучения о зернах, деревьях и плодах, обращаются к известным ветхозаветным образам. В частности стоит перечитать Псалмы.
Первый Псалом говорит о блаженствах праведника.  Праведный муж не отклоняется в сторону нечестивых, грешных и развратителей. Он пребывает в законе Господа день и ночь.
А затем идут два сильных образа: праведник – плодоносное дерево, нечестивые – «прах, возметаемый ветром».
«И будет он как дерево, посаженное при потоках вод, которое приносит плод свой во время свое и лист которого не вянет; и во всем, что он ни делает, успеет. Не так – нечестивые: но они как прах, возметаемый ветром» (Пс. 1:3-4).
Праведник укоренен и напитан, цветущ и плодоносен, здоров и успешен. 
Нечестивый живет одним днем и уносится первым ветром.
Праведник – как долголетнее дерево, он показывает собой красоту и силу Божью. 
«Праведник цветет как пальма, возвышается подобно кедру на Ливане. Насажденные в доме Господнем, они цветут во дворах Бога нашего; они и в старости сочны и свежи, чтобы возвещать, что праведен Господь, твердыня моя» (Пс. 91:13-16).
В отличие от нечестивых, которые растрачиваются себя в бесцельных удовольствиях и пустой трате времени, праведники не вянут, лишь растут и обновляются.
У тех, кто живет Богом, есть все необходимое, чтобы цвести и приносить плоды, быть крепкими и красивыми во славу Господа.  
Не будем говорить о старости, не будем увядать  раньше времени, напротив будем радоваться жизни в Божьем саду и будем радовать Бога своими плодами.

The Church’s social activism in post-Maidan Ukraine

The Church’s social activism in post-Maidan Ukraine

New Eastern Europe
April 17, 2018


During the times of crisis of Ukrainian statehood and Russian aggression, churches proved to be trusted leaders who promoted the consolidation of the emerging civil society.

The Maidan events and the subsequent war became catalysts for the revitalisation of Orthodox churches and the revival of a volunteer movement, as well leading to a demarcation between a pro-Ukrainian minority and a passive majority. Despite the ongoing disputes about canonicity and church status, civilly active and patriotic church groups began taking more initiative. Not surprisingly, it was the Kiev Patriarchate and Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church that spearheaded the national liberation movement. The Protestant Church also became engaged, as they had a well-developed network of communities in the east of the country and used their resources for social work during the ongoing war. That activism changed the religious map of the country. The churches that gained recognition and influence were not always the canonical ones, but rather those that were socially responsible. The social ministry of the church during the post-Maidan period became the main sign of its presence and the main criterion of its value as assessed by civil society. The church activism in the wider community helped the nation during a very difficult moment in its history, and also helped churches take the initiative to be a responsible part of civil society.
For the last eight years churches have had the highest level of trust (compared to other groups) from the public. However it was only under the conditions of the Maidan and later during wartime that this trust was tested in practice. For the first time churches claimed an active role, not just a declarative one, and were able to fully realise their social potential within that relationship. Volunteers and churches compete for having the highest level of public trust.  Some surveys show that churches are ahead and some state the volunteers are, but in all cases churches and volunteers are very close. According to Irina Bekeshkina, “Among non-governmental groups, volunteers are trusted the most. They are followed by churches and community organizations”.
This proximity is very significant. It is only in direct relationship with community organizations and volunteer movements that the churches can fully develop their potential in carrying out their social ministry. Moreover, it is the churches that are the biggest movers and shakers in this sphere. Jose Casanova, a scholar in the sociology of religion, predicted the inevitable losses that came after the revolution and the disappointments to the Ukrainian society. He expressed certainty in strong support from churches however: “Religious communities will be ready to accompany and support a mobilised population”
The difficulty of a sociological assessment is that the churches not only direct the activists and the volunteers supporting them, but also include themselves in that number. Many of those volunteers are also parishioners of those same churches.
We can understand how volunteers evaluate themselves: “The most significant result of the Revolution of Dignity – apart from the one where Ukrainians are recognizing the need to build a national state – has been the emergence of a volunteer movement which is an important component of civil society and a main driving force in the reformation of the country”.
It should be added that the most significant result was not an emergence of a volunteer movement as such, but rather the integration of different civil and church initiatives. Since then it has been impossible to distinguish between civil and church volunteers.
Moreover, it would be devastating to divide the volunteer movement. After all, it is the spiritual foundation that ensures unity, a sense of purpose, and consistency of civil initiatives, especially in times of fatigue and decline.
Western researchers note that the civil protest on Maidan that grew into the national volunteer movement was inspired and guided by the Christian idea of the dignity of persons created in God’s image. As Catherine Wanner, an anthropologist, observes, “Dignity plays a central role in the myriad of ways in which the Maidan is now commemorated as a ‘Revolution of Dignity’(…), and paved the way for an alternative vision for uniting the people of Ukraine”.
Due to the spiritual leadership of churches and a corresponding Christian “design,” the spontaneous protest that formed the Euromaidan, developed into a non-violent Revolution of Dignity. This theological explanation of those events gives us a framework within which we can understand the Maidan and the war that followed as a road to national consolidation based on Christian values.
Consequently, the present-day socio-political understanding of key ideas and values of Christian social teaching allowed the volunteer movement to gain a solid spiritual foundation and a nationwide perspective. Since the Maidan, the development of civil society has gone hand in hand with the motivating and leading role of churches. Mistrust and tensions between the civil society and church community will cause mutual damage. Attempts of either side to control autonomous initiatives would both be damaging (as would control by the government, a third party). And the question is whether these different churches are able to coexist and co-serve society without attempting to suppress religious and cultural diversity. The logic is simple: The majority of the population of Ukraine consider themselves part of some type of a Christian church. If these churches are able to agree and demonstrate to society a model of peaceful Christian diversity, it would become the basis for national reconciliation and a way to find unity in diversity.
The main question of post-Maidan Ukraine is not whether the country will have enough strength to protect itself from Russian aggression, but whether it is generous enough to embrace diversity, accept it, and activate the potential of each church tradition for serving the common good. While many Ukrainian patriots continue to strive for a unified local church, Jose Casanova, who has the perspective of an outsider, advises Ukrainians to protect this diversity and appreciate our privilege and wealth: “The question is whether we can accept not only multiplicity as an inevitable social fact but also pluralism – religious and political – as worthy and good … Although the lack of unity contradicts religious and nationalistic traditions that have been rooted in religion, it can, in fact, be a benefit that will facilitate the formation of a religiously tolerant, pluralistic, and democratic Ukraine.”
The Protestant case
Ukrainian Protestants are a religious minority that is rather consolidated and active. Most of them belong to the “second wave” of Reformation (second half of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century); so the mainstream of Ukrainian Protestantism is being formed not by Lutherans or Reformers but by Baptists and Pentecostals. All of them call themselves “evangelical,” and this way of presenting themselves says a lot. They believe the church has to go back to evangelical truths; it has to reform and renew itself before changing society.  Cited above, Casanova sees them as a catalyst for cultivating religious and cultural diversity: “Although Ukrainian Catholics and Protestants make up no more than 10 per cent of the Ukrainian population. Their number in churches on Sundays is no less than that of the Orthodox, noting that the number of the Orthodox in Ukraine is approximately 6 times more.” Because of their social activism, the “difference between ‘churches’ and ‘sects’, ‘national confession’ and ‘religious minority’ has been disappearing.” This interreligious recognition and mutual respect was enhanced by the Maidan experience when priests, pastors, rabbis, and representatives of almost all Ukrainian communities served others side by side over the course of a couple of months”. At the same time, Protestantism (as much as it can be “evangelical”) serves not only as a driving force for diversity but also encourages unity as it appeals to broadly Christian origins.
In all fairness we have to recognize that Protestantism is not thoroughly patriotic and civilly active. The Maidan protest attracted active minorities, including Protestant minorities. Generally speaking, Protestant communities were divided and not very unified prior to the outbreak of hostilities in the Donbass. This eastern region of Ukraine was their “canonical” territory; as it was the most Protestant region. Hence it is natural that when the conflict spilled over to their territory, it raised questions of how Ukrainian they really were and how they could serve the Ukrainian nation.
The war changed many Protestant leaders of that region. A well-known pastor from Mariupol stated at the beginning of war that: “It does not matter in which soil the potatoes are planted – Ukrainian or Russian,” but in a matter of a few days he was digging trenches defending his hometown.
A pastor of a Baptist church from Pervomaisk (Lugansk region) said that the war was almost like “being born again” to him: “When I came face to face with war, I realised it had made me different” Their church building was ruined, but the church community carried on with their ministry saving the wounded and feeding the hungry, evacuating people from the front lines to safety, and taking care of scattered refugees. The church reached beyond its burnt walls to be with the people and serve them. That was creating a new community: “Now our people have a chance to build a new society – a country everyone would want to live in, and a country that we would not be ashamed to pass on to our children. But it is impossible to start building it without having knelt before God first, and without being heartbroken”.
These ministers perceived that the war had become an opportunity for the nation to spiritually renew itself and consolidate basing on Christian values, and also an opportunity for the church to go beyond its walls and get closer to people. The British theologian Joshua Searle wrote about a “Church Without Walls” as a vision that Ukrainian Protestants follow. He has a separate chapter on this under the title Church Without Walls: Reimagining Church and Post-Soviet Society. “A church that wants to work in tandem with the humanising forces of civil society will not be concerned to consolidate a religious institution based on order and hierarchy, but instead be much more involved in building authentic communities of grace. The success of this kind of mission is expressed not in triumph of Christianity over society, but in compassion for and involvement in society”.
Church Without Walls is more than just a metaphor; it is a reality of frontline territories where churches with similar names are appearing. Protestants go to these abandoned and half-dead places with practical help and a message of bringing “bread for life” and “bread of life,” gathering frightened people into communities of faith. They see the battlefield as the mission field. In their mission strategy, outreach and social ministry always go hand in hand. Due to this holistic approach to ministry, Protestant churches have not lost their influence. Moreover, they have strengthened it. As analysts confirm, “It was they who have become the most active social groups during the turbulent events in the east of Ukraine. The Protestants managed to collect entire convoys of food and humanitarian aid, evacuate over 55,000 people from a war zone, take care of and resettle more than 30,000 refugees from Donbass throughout Ukraine”.
Social activity was not limited to traditional humanitarian aid but evolved into other forms as well: Soup kitchens were opened, social bakeries were established, and shelters were started. The Protestants had to learn the ministry of chaplaincy, which was unfamiliar to them. Modest estimates indicate that two hundred ministers of evangelical churches work as chaplains today.
Diverse social activity has changed the image of Protestant churches in the region and in the entire country, and has also changed the churches’ self-image. The Protestants were used to their marginal status, and now they are getting used to their status of full-fledged members of an inter-church Christian community. The Protestants were used to being the “citizens of heaven” and now they have to discover Ukrainianness. As a pastor from a frontline area gave testimony – “Now the church gives more than it receives. The church is quite active; it takes part in people’s needs and works very closely with volunteers. The first thing that we did was painting the bridges into a yellow and blue colour…. We say that we are citizens of heaven … but the country awaits you…”.
But patriotism has not been (and will not be) the last way Protestants view themselves and their place in society. Even the most patriotic leaders of Protestant churches talk about reconciliation as church ministry: “We believe that the process of reconciliation should start with the churches. This is our challenge and our responsibility…. Are we looking for security and a peaceful life simply by building a wall between our wrongdoers and us? This is not the mission of the church”. This means that the church does not only see the war as an opportunity to take on a role in order to gain public recognition. As the church looks past the war, it sees its mission from the perspective of reconciliation.
Obviously, the ministry of reconciliation is not as popular in Ukrainian society as chaplain or volunteer ministries are, but it is these less popular ministries that distinguish the church from the more current civil initiatives. They offer a prospect of universalism to the society – one that does not abolish patriotism but corrects regional, political, and ethnic particularities.
Unlike the more ancient and influential “historical” church, “mother church,” and “national” churches, Ukrainian Protestants are not building on history, tradition, and canon law, and do not claim an exclusive influence from the post-Maidan community. They remain a religious minority and accept this status. They are building upon the Gospel and evangelical values, and by doing so they are outlining the most inclusive and social religious vision for Christianity in Ukraine and for the Christian Ukraine. While references to history divide churches and society, the Protestant appeal to a broadly Christian and evangelical foundation that is in the words of C. S. Lewis, “mere Christianity”, showing the way to consolidation.
Conclusions
 Ukrainian churches turned out to be a key factor in encouraging civil society during the Maidan events and the following Russian-Ukrainian war. The trust that society has placed in churches is demanding and carries with it high expectations. There is still the risk that in the strife over canonicity, the churches may lose society’s trust and become a “weak link” in civil society. At the same time, a clearly pro-Ukrainian inter-church consensus has emerged. It was approved by the decision of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations and joint ministry in the war zone. In caring for the country and for the common good, the churches can set an example of reconciliation and consolidation. As the civil society follows this example, it will be able to grow stronger and open up. One way or another, it was the Ukrainian churches that were the backbone of civil society in the post-Maidan period of Ukrainian history. But the question remains open whether they will continue to show initiative, use all their potential for the good of society, and show a model of unity. All the while, there is every opportunity to do so.

Христианство после христианства

Христианство после христианства
Мы все время переживаем о закате христианства, теряя в этих переживаниях радость воскресения и обещание скорой победы. 
Вокруг все чаще говорят не только о христианстве постмодерна, но и о христианстве в постхристианскую эпоху. Все это о том, что нечто христианское все еще остается даже «после христианства».
Не случайно некоторые христианские мыслители говорят о своей вере как «религии, преодолевающей себя».
Что же остается от христианства после христианства? Что в остатке?
Бог после метафизики жив и будет жить. А христианство? 
Сможет ли оно пройти через постмодерн и его смерть, воскреснув для новой эпохи?
Мне очень нравится мысль Александра Башлачева:
«Что такое свет и тьма? Тут очень легко можно разобраться. Тень — она всегда сзади. Если ты обернешься, сзади будет тьма, а впереди всегда будет свет. Понимаешь, о чем речь? То место, по которому ты идешь, всегда тьма. Свет всегда впереди. Граница проходит прямо по твоим ногам. Если ты шагнул, ты шагнул во тьму, но одновременно ты ее и одолел».
Для настоящего и светлого есть только одно направление – вперед. И это вопрос о настоящем христианстве или настоящем христианском в христианства: найдет ли христианство в себе мужество пройти через времена постмодерна, а не обманывать себя и людей картинками «золотого века»?
Христианство все еще возможно даже после Christendom. Как рассказ, свидетельство, опыт встречи. Здесь можно вспомнить историю о выступлении безбожника Луначарского. Все молчали. Его аргументы казались железными. Но вдруг один дед вышел вперед и робко сказал: «Христос воскрес». И весь народ ответил громко: «Воистину воскрес!».
Христианство возможно как переживание света, красоты и благости мира. Среди войны всех против всех мы еще способны переживать моменты просветления, когда нам открываются картинки «Мирного царства», просветы в иную реальность.
То, что христианство возможно, согласны почти все. Но большинство считает, что оно возможно лишь в слабой форме, как слишком слабое и слишком скромное, не способное на провозглашения и призывы. 
Но Сам Христос говорил о Себе сильными словами: «Я есмь путь, истина и жизнь». Христианство – не просто один из нарративов, но гранднарратив. Оно способно быть сильным и побеждающим — в меру следования за Христом.
Наше христианство должно быть сильным, но в своем роде.
Вспомним: все формы постмодернизма посвящены теме власти и насилия. Они о том, что вся история – это история насилия, господства и подчинения. Представляя мир таким образом, они это насилие оправдывают и санкционируют.
Не случайно мы видим не только университетский постмодерн на Западе, но и агрессивный милитаристский остмодерн «русского мира». 
Христианский ответ такому представлению о мире и такому отношению к миру должен быть сильным, но не насильственным. 
Христос позволил Себя распять, но не позволил Себя победить. 
Он добровольно отдал Себя на смерть, но не остался во гробе.
Он воскрес, явив торжество любви. 
Распятый и воскресший Христос – Победитель.  Его любовь всесильная, всепобеждающая. 
Следуя за Ним, мы тоже можем побеждать и верить, что после каждой смерти открывается новая жизнь, обновляется наша вера. 
Постмодерн грозит христианству еще одним поражением но неминуемо окажется очередной победой Христа и Его истины.
Как блестяще выразился Честертон, «Да, много раз — при Арии, при альбигойцах, при гуманистах, при Вольтере, при Дарвине… (…при постмодерне, при постхристианстве… — МЧ) — вера, несомненно, катилась ко всем чертям. И всякий раз погибали черти. Каким полным и неожиданным бывало их поражение, мы можем убедиться на собственном нашем примере”.
Христианство после христианства только начинается, и будет оно только сильнее. Тем новее и сильнее, чем больше будет в нем Христа, Его силы, Его жизни.

Усмирить великанов

Усмирить великанов
Мы боимся больших и сильных, самоуверенных и наглых. Они возвышаются и смеются над нами. Они лишают нас достоинства, парализуют нас страхом.
Но есть сила, большая чем страх. Это ревность и дерзновение веры. 
Воины-профессионалы на это почти не способны.
Победить великанов может лишь тот, кто верит в чудо, кто не смирился с унижением, кто видел сильную руку Божью.
Таким был юный Давид. 
В то время как все Израильтяне, увидев Голиафа, «убегали от него и весьма боялись», пастушок недоумевал: «Кто этот необрезанный Филистимлянин, что так поносит воинство Бога живого?» (1 Царств 17:24,26). 
Давид верил в силу Божью и потом не пугался громадного роста этого Рефаима. Его пример вдохновил других Израильтян бросить вызов великанам Рефаимам.
Так Совохай Хушатянин поразил Сафа,  а Елханан — Лахмия. Был еще «рослый человек, у которого было по шести пальцев, всего двадцать четыре. И он также был из потомков Рефаимов. Он поносил Израиля, но Ионафан, сын Шимы, брата Давидова, поразил его» (1 Пар. 20:6-7).
От великанов не стыдно убегать. Но если эти гиганты «поносят» Божий народ, смеются над нашей верой и нашим Богом, то у нас не остается выбора, кроме как призвать имя Божье и поразить их мечом или кулаком, словом или камнем. 
Слуги Давида поразили великанов, и «они усмирились». 
Так весь мир узнал, что кроме силы великанов есть сила веры, доступная даже для простых людей. 
Так Израиль обрел свободу, а Бог Израиля был прославлен и возвеличен.
Как бы глаза не боялись, как бы колени не тряслись, мы должны всегда помнить: сила веры сильнее чем вера в силу.